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he decline of world trade has attracted a lot of attention in the past three years. After an initial recovery 
in 2010, due in large part to rising import and exports in emerging and developing economies, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) has revised downwards the prospects of world trade in October 
2011. Warning that ‘we have now moved from a inancial to a growth crisis’ and that ‘multilateralism is 
a precarious position’, Deputy Director-General Ruhwabiza calls upon WTO Members to successfully 
conclude the Doha Round and extend the remit of the WTO to Non-Tarif Barriers (NTBs) and more 
generally to the regulatory environmental of trade (including technical standards, competition policy 
and investment rules).2 Whether these responses are adequate to deal with the current challenges, 
including the decline of world trade and growth, depends very much on our understanding of the 
processes that have led to the current crisis.
Previous inancial crises such as the ones in Mexico, South East Asia, Russia and Argentina were 
thought to be limited to certain regions in terms of both their efects and causes. Indeed the cause 
was often attributed to the improper implementation on the part of these countries of policies whose 
rationale was hardly ever called into question. his crisis however strikes at the heart of a system, the 
Anglo-American one, which has been promoted as the example of progress and stability throughout the 
world.3 his is why alongside calls for reforming the international inancial system, serious questions 
began also to be raised about the international economic system, in particular its role in promoting the 
process of inancialisation of the economy (i.e. the exponential increase of investment and inancial 
assets) and the impact this has had on the real economy (i.e. the realm within which goods and services 
are produced). In this context, inequality has provided an important lens trough which to examine the 
relationship between the so called inancial and real spheres of the economy.
he inequality explanation has brought to light the connections between three interrelated processes.4 
Firstly, the rise of unequal income distribution which has led, since the 1990s, to insuicient demand 
at the global level: the argument is that while proits have been increasing, the share of national income 
going to workers in the USA, Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and 
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the Caribbean has decreased.5 Second, as a result of the wage compression that has led to insuicient 
demand, household debt in the US and UK has increased to support otherwise unsustainable standards 
of living. Recourse to debt has therefore become a mechanism through which demand has been kept 
up and this has been actively supported by governments until 2007 when the subprime crisis erupted. 
Finally investments in inancial assets have also increased noticeably and recent research on the demand 
side of the securitisation process has shown how the wealth amassed by hedge funds, in particular by 
their ‘net worth’ investors, has been the driving force behind the proliferation of these risky inancial 
instruments.6 he inequality lens therefore clearly shows that the present situation requires not only 
proper regulation of the international inancial system but also, and especially, redressing the unequal 
and unsustainable international economic system of production and distribution to which the former 
is linked.
A related question in this respect is the extent to which we can speak of a global crisis. Many developing 
and middle income countries have been hit less hard than the US and Europe despite the decline in 
the demand for manufactured and commodity exports - this is particularly the case for countries 
reliant on export earnings - and a likely drop in tourist expenditures and remittances.7 his is not to 
say these transmission channels are not important. Indeed the crisis has brought to light the degree 
of interconnectedness of the international economy. However, the fact that this crisis derives from a 
particular model of growth and development fostered by the countries of the so-called North needs to 
be kept in mind when thinking of responses to the current state of afairs. At the same time the complex 
connections that have resulted from thirty years of policies based on such model and implemented at 
the international level need to be carefully traced rather than simply assumed.
One such connection is the one deriving from the complex international web of demand, trade and 
inance. his consists of the low of demand from countries in structural deicit, such as the US, to 
countries in structural surplus, such as China and Japan, a process which has been mirrored by the 
investment of the latter’s surplus in the purchase of treasury bills issued by the countries in deicit. 
hese reciprocal lows are today threatened by the fact that US consumers are saving much more than 
they did in the past when recourse to debt was actively supported and encouraged (demand for private 
credit has decreased by 13% in the US).8 he collapse of private spending, and therefore demand, 
is likely to occur in Europe too as a result of austerity measures that will generate job losses and a 
consequent drop of income. hus, as Marazzi has pointed out, this crisis has interrupted the very 
mechanism which has allowed the international economy to grow, although in an unequal way, over 
the last three decades.
  5 S. Seguino (2010) ‘he Global Economic Crisis, its gender and ethnic implications, and policy responses’, 18:2 
Gender and Development, 186-193
 6 S. Seguino (2010) ‘he Global Economic Crisis, its gender and ethnic implications, and policy responses’, 18:2 
Gender and Development, 186-193
 7 See Pinto, 307 and Seguino, note 4.
 8 C. Marazzi (2010) he Violence of Financial Capitalism (London: he MIT Press), 15
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 10 WTO, note 1.
 11 See Marazzi, note 7.
From this angle the important question is not how to remove NTBs to promote a more eicient 
environment for trade and better integration but how to stimulate demand without having recourse to 
debt. Indeed the fact that the decline of trade is outpacing that of GDP is less worrying than the fact 
that consumers in the US and Europe are not spending and consequently not generating demand. he 
fact that trade is declining faster than global GDP, or a recent Report by he International Economy 
has put it ‘faster than at any time since the Great Depression’, is attributable to many factors but an 
important one is the role played by global supply chains.9 he intra-irm trade that started at the 
end of the 1970s, when the shift away from the Keynesian consensus towards neo-liberal policies of 
privatisation, liberalisation and de-regulation took place in the US and Europe, created new market 
opportunities for private actors to invest around the world, thanks also to technological innovations 
which facilitated companies’ horizontal as well as vertical integration. his shift has meant that trade 
no longer involves simple transactions between two countries as companies have created global supply 
chains, making use of facilities in diferent countries for diferent stages of the production process. he 
implication of this is that, while GDP is counted on a value added basis, intra irm trade is counted 
several times as it crosses borders.
his is not to say that trade is not slowing down but that its movements are magniied in comparison to 
movements in output. Since the latter is therefore much more signiicant than the former, eforts should 
concentrate on how to stimulate demand and therefore production of output, rather than on how to 
remove NTBs and extend the remit of the WTO as argued by Deputy Director-General Ruhwabiza.10 
How can demand be stimulated? As already mentioned this is unlikely to happen in Europe and 
the US unless the current emphasis on austerity and deicit reduction is abandoned and the trend 
towards inequality resulting from further wage compression reversed through massive investment in 
the economy. his requires a political will of which there is no sign at the moment. he repercussions 
of this drop in demand will be felt especially by emerging economies and developing countries whose 
growth has been export oriented, particularly when exports have been oriented towards European 
and North American markets. As it stands now it seems unlikely that these countries will be able to 
compensate for the drop in demand. However a diferent chapter in the history of world trade could 
be written by taking into account the increasing relevance of southern trade, as evidenced by the fact 
that of the total exports of emerging countries, which amounted to 35% of GDP over the last 5 years, 
only 20% were made to developed countries while 15% resulted from South-South trade, that is trade 
between emerging economies.11
South-South trade was indeed what temporarily accounted for faster growth in the irst half of 2010 
according to the WTO, even though this recovery has been challenged in the second half. As Marazzi 
observes, for these countries (China, India, Russia and South American countries in particular)to be 
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able to stimulate global demand they would need to raise internal wages and make greater investments 
in the local economy than the ones they have made until now so to create a vibrant domestic market. 
his however implies that their savings would no longer be directed towards Northern countries but 
towards internal demand, which would consequently deprive the international monetary and inancial 
system of the same mechanism that has allowed the global economy to function the way it has until 
now. As far as the economies of Northern countries are concerned, this will likely introduce profound 
changes in production and consumption patterns. he present power geometry would certainly be 
altered by such a shift although how this can play out remains to be seen. However, given the current 
situation such a scenario cannot be easily discarded.
Should the conditions for such transformation emerge, the WTO will be confronted with demands 
for more policy autonomy than currently allowed by its rules in order for states to enact industrial 
policies. I have argued elsewhere that the combined efect of the WTO agreements, especially the 
GATS, TRIMs and TRIPs, together with the rules on subsidies, has been that of restricting the 
regulatory autonomy of its members, particularly its developing country members.12 Although Special 
and Diferential Treatment is still formally part of the WTO apparatus, this has been reconceptualised 
to allow for longer transition periods and technical assistance in order to assist countries with 
implementing the various agreements. However substantial reciprocity has been reintroduced within 
the multilateral trade regime and the Single Undertaking Approach to the WTO negotiations is one 
important manifestation of this: in a round supposed to be about development, developing countries 
will have to further liberalise services under the GATS and accept greater commitments under Non 
Agricultural Market access (NAMA) in order to beneit from substantial reduction of distortions in 
agricultural trade, the birth defect of the GATT which the WTO agreement failed to adequately 
redress . In the meanwhile the demand of developing countries that Special and Diferential Treatment 
provisions be revised and made more efective and operational – a demand which is part of the Doha 
negotiating agenda - has received little attention and made no signiicant progress after ten years. he 
Doha Development Round has therefore ended up being much more about market access for northern 
countries than about development: these countries, and the US and EU in particular, have continued 
the practice started under GATT of protecting their markets by pursuing selective trade liberalisation 
while ensuring that the means of industrial policies they once used would be restricted for developing 
countries. his is the practice Ha-Joon Chang has famously referred to as ‘kicking away the ladder’.13
Such a practice has always been challenged by developing countries and indeed the ascendancy of 
emerging economies is in no small part attributable to the fact that trade liberalisation and market 
integration have always been accompanied by tailored government intervention. As strategic trade 
theory has demonstrated so called comparative advantage is actively shaped and cultivated rather than 
  12 D. Alessandrini (2010) Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trade Regime: he Failure and Promise of the 
WTO’s Development Mission (Oxford: Hart Publishing)
 13 H.J Chang (2002) Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective: Policies and 
Institutions for Economic Development in Historical Perspective (London: Anthem Press).
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being determined by natural endowments. he implication of this is that countries can actively pursue, 
and indeed have pursued, innovations in certain sectors of the economy through targeted intervention.
he demand for greater lexibility from WTO rules is likely to increase in the foreseeable future if 
countries decide to pursue industrial policies so to stimulate internal demand. his is the crucial 
challenge the WTO will face: it can either hold on to the narrative of free trade v. protectionism and 
continue to uphold the normative case for uniform trade liberalisation; or it can recognise that states 
and markets are always in dynamic interaction (embodying diferent combinations of liberalisation 
and intervention at diferent times) and support the case for greater lexibility, thereby rejecting the 
one size its all liberalisation model. his is both a theoretical and political challenge and the way in 
which it will be taken up will tell whether or not the WTO, as well as the case for multilateralism, is 
still relevant or has become redundant.
